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1. Introduction 
This paper proposes that the experience of attending to an object becomes an experience 
of being aware of that object when it is conjoined with attending to a representation of the 
self. In other words, awareness occurs when "an experience" becomes "my experience". 
Attention is assumed here to be an event in the brain consisting of simultaneous 
neuroactivity in three areas, which are interconnected by a triangular circuit (LaBerge, 
1995). The three activity sites correspond to three aspects of attention: expression, 
enhancement mechanism, and control. The brain sites corresponding to each of these 
aspects are: (a) for the expression, clusters of neurons in the posterior and anterior cortex 
that serve cognitive functions, such as perceptions of objects and attributes, and the 
organizing and executing of action plans, (b) for the enhancement mechanism, the 
thalamic nuclei, whose excitatory neurons activate neurons in corresponding cortical 
columns (see Figure 1 <1>), and (c) for the control, clusters of neurons in the frontal 
cortex. When the three sites are simultaneously active, it is said that an attentional event 
occurs.  
Figure 1 
 
Schematic diagram of the three major (human) brain sites connected in an attentional triangular 
circuit that results in attentional intensification of activity in a cortical column cluster. The presumed 
control site in prefrontal cortex directly selects the site of attentional expression in the 
occipitotemporal cortex, and this control site also regulates the intensity of the cortical expression in 
the occipitotemporal cortex by means of the indirect connection through a thalamic nucleus. The 
posterior cortical areas serve mainly perceptions, while the anterior cortical areas serve mainly 
actions, and sites of attention expression may exist in both areas.  
The triad of sites connected by the triangular circuit is initially activated by sources inside 
and outside the system. Internal sources normally activate the triangular circuit at the 
frontal control node of the circuit. These endogenous sources are connected with 
motivational areas of the brain (e.g., the basal ganglia), and may operate through 
momentary considerations of the person's interests or may operate relatively 
automatically by habitual interests. External sources are sensory stimuli (e.g., abrupt 
onsets that involve the orienting system) that activate the cortical column site where 
attention is eventually expressed. However, it is assumed here that the activations of 
these cortical sites of attentional expression from sources exogenous to the system are not 
sufficient to produce an attentional expression, owing to their short durations and rapidly 
decaying intensities. In order to achieve a sufficiently intense and long lasting activation 
in a column cluster (to qualify as an expression of attention), the appropriate frontal area 
must be signaled to return activation to that column. 
 
2. The Triangular Circuit 
Since most of the knowledge we have of cortical and thalamic circuitry has been obtained 
from studies of the primary visual cortex and its adjacent areas, the description given here 
of the triangular circuit is based on a schematic diagram of the triangular circuit involving 
areas V1 and V2. In Figure 2 the direct (forward) connecting fibers between a V1 column 
and V2 column arise from Layer 5 of the V1 column, and terminate on a thalamic relay 
neuron, which in turn projects to the middle layers of a V2 column. Thus, at the thalamic relay neuron, a Layer 5 neuron of a V1 column has the same anatomical relation to a V2 
column that an optic nerve cell has to a V1 column. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Schematic diagrams of excitatory neurons within a pair of cortical columns and within a thalamic 
nucleus, along with their main interconnections. The forward connection from the first column (e.g., 
in area V1) to the second column (e.g., in area V2) occurs both directly and indirectly by means of a 
synapse in a thalamic nucleus, forming a triangular circuit.  
Evidence from neural tracing studies (e.g., Ungerleider, Galkin, & Mishkin, 1983) 
indicate that V1 fibers synapse on the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus (which projects 
directly to V2) and indicate that these fibers arise from Layer 5 of V1 (Conley and 
Razkowski, 1990). Relay neurons in the pulvinar project directly to area V2 (Jones, 
1985), as well as to the other visual areas in the posterior cortex (including V1). Thus, the 
triangular circuit depicted in Figure 2 begins with neurons in a V1 column that connect 
with a V2 column by a direct connection and by an indirect connection by way of the 
thalamus. 
The indirect connection between V1 and V2 that enlists thalamic neurons, shown in 
Figure 2 appears to have characteristics that enhance firing rates. Layer 5 neurons fire in 
bursts of a few spikes at rates at least as high as 250 Hz, with intraburst firing rates on the 
order of 15 Hz (Connors & Gutnick, 1990; Gray & McCormick, 1996), and therefore 
these neurons have the ability to drive their target neurons to high rates of firing. The 
intrinsically spiking Layer 5 neurons synapse near the cell bodies of thalamic relay 
neurons and are therefore in a privileged position to drive the spike outputs of the cell 
body. Layer 6 neurons, whose fibers have smaller diameters and thus can be 
distinguished from those of Layer 5, synapse well away from the cell body, mostly at 
remote locations on the dendrite (Sherman, 1990). A major function of Layer 6 axons is 
to lower the threshold of the thalamic neuron, so that signals arriving at synapses near the 
cell body will have a greater probability of inducing the cell body to fire (McCormick & Von Krosigk, 1992). Thus, the feedback loop involving Layer 6 neurons and the thalamic 
relay neuron appears to facilitate synaptic transmission of Layer 5 neurons contacting that 
relay neuron. This reduction of threshold at the synapse would potentiate the already 
strong effects of the bursting Layer 5 neurons on the receiving relay neuron. 
It is therefore conjectured that the thalamocortical loop, involving the ascending thalamic 
relay fibers together with the feedback fibers from Layer 6 neurons, has the ability to 
enhance firing rates of input fibers arriving from Layer 5 cells of another column. This 
conjecture is supported by a study in which the thalamocortical circuit was modeled as a 
neuron network so that simulations of its operations could be carried out for a selective 
attention task (LaBerge, Carter, & Brown, 1992). The neural network was based on the 
known interconnections of all the types of thalamic neurons, including the local 
inhibitory cells and the reticular nucleus inhibitory cells, which are located between the 
relay cells and the cortical columns to which they project. The results of the simulations 
in that study showed sharp increases in firing-rate trajectories in cortical cells 
corresponding to attended stimuli (relative to trajectories in cortical columns 
corresponding to neighboring unattended stimuli). In particular, small initial differences 
between inputs to the relay cells (from Layer 5 cells in cortical areas of attentional 
control) serving target and distractor columns were strongly magnified (e.g., by a factor 
of 25 or more) by the thalamocortical circuit. Thus, the thalamocortical circuit appears to 
function as an enhancement mechanism of cortical activity. 
Supporting evidence for the existence of the triangular circuit in other regions of the 
cortex is provided by the confirmation of large Layer 5 fibers that synapse near the relay 
cell body and small Layer 6 fibers that synapse at the distal regions of the relay dendrites 
of the auditory cortex (Ojima, 1994) and for the prefrontal cortex (Schwartz, Dekker, & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1991). Since all regions of the cortex are connected with the thalamus (it 
has been said in a personal communication by a noted neurophysiologist that thalamic 
cells constitute the seventh layer of cortex), it seems highly probable that the triangular 
circuit exists wherever cortical columns in one area communicate with columns in 
another area. Figure 3 shows the diagram of several proposed triangular circuits crossing 
cortical areas (LaBerge, 1995) that would appear to have the structure to be particularly 
relevant to attentional processing in the brain.  
Figure 3 
 
Schematic diagrams of some of the triangular circuits in the visual system. The triangular circuits 
serving visual attention are believed to originate in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) for 
location and in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) for shape. Effects in the posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC) of DLPFC activations may be relayed to V4 via an attentional triangular 
circuit to select the location of a part of a stimulus array.  
The proposed triangular circuits of Figure 3 function to amplify corticocortical 
connections in both bottom-up and top-down directions. Triangular circuits confined to 
the posterior cortical regions presumably enhance bottom-up sources of cortical column 
activation. However, the set of triangular circuits of most interest in this paper are those 
that project activation in the top-down direction to posterior cortical columns in which 
attention is expressed. It is conjectured here that the enhancement operations provided by 
the thalamic part of the triangular circuit typically are stronger and of longer duration 
when the circuit involves top-down sources of activation than when it involves only 
bottom-up sources of activation. 
Several PET experiments have shown activation of the pulvinar during visual attention. 
When subjects attended to the shape of many objects in a multidimensional visual display 
in order to detect small changes in their size, activation was found in a region containing 
the right pulvinar (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1991). Activations 
were located in the right pulvinar when subjects concentrated attention (in the prolonged 
anticipatory mode) to a single target shape in a known location to the right or left of 
center fixation (LaBerge & Buchsbaum, 1990). Using the same anticipatory attention task 
of the LaBerge and Buchsbaum (1990) experiment, Liotti, Fox, & LaBerge (1994; 
submitted) compared hard and easy levels of attentional difficulty with a control 
condition and examined changes throughout most of the brain. The right pulvinar effect 
was strongly confirmed for the hard task (when the hard task condition was compared 
with that of the easy task as well as with that of the control task). Two other thalamic 
regions showed activations when the hard condition was compared with the easy and 
control conditions. One activated thalamic region contained the mediodorsal nucleus, 
which connects strongly with the prefrontal cortex and also with the posterior parietal 
cortex (in monkeys); this region was also activated in the Corbetta et al. (1991) study 
with shapes and in the Heinze et al. (1994) study in which subjects sustained focal attention on locations in the right visual field. The other region activated by the hard task 
in the Liotti et al. study was the ventrolateral nucleus, which connects with both frontal 
areas and the basal ganglia. Corbetta et al. (1991) found activations at or near this region 
when subjects discriminated shape sizes or changes in the velocity of shape movements, 
and Corbetta et al. (1993) found activations in this region when subjects shifted attention 
toward the right in the right visual field. Thus, three regions of the thalamus have been 
shown to be selectively active when humans attend to visual shapes and their locations. 
At the same time that thalamic nuclei are active in these visual attention tasks, cortical 
regions that are directly connected with these thalamic nuclei are also active. 
Occipitotemporal areas and posterior parietal areas, which are closely connected with the 
pulvinar nucleus, showed activations in the Corbetta et al. (1991) and Liotti et al. 
(submitted) studies. These areas are presumed to exhibit the expressions of attention to 
shapes and locations. Prefrontal areas in the dorsal areas in the dorsal (DLPFC / 
premotor) region and the ventral (VLPFC) region were also activated in the Liotti et al. 
study. These areas of the frontal cortex are strongly implicated in the voluntary control of 
location and shape, respectively (e.g., Wilson, O'Scalaidhe, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993; 
Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991). Thus, taken together, these PET studies 
show activations both in thalamic nuclei and in the cortical areas of attentional expression 
and attentional control that are reciprocally connected with these thalamic nuclei. 
 
3. Attention and Awareness 
Traditionally, the term "awareness" has often been used synonymously with the term 
"consciousness", which has been called a "mongrel" concept, owing to the variety of its 
definitions (Block, 1995). A main goal of this paper is to forge a clear concept of 
"awareness" in the brain not by attempting to distinguish it from "consciousness" , but 
rather by defining it with concepts described in the earlier part of this paper. Specifically, 
an event of awareness is conjectured to involve (a) the operation of attention (b) which is 
directed toward a representation of the self. Thus, it is presumed that awareness requires 
an attentional event that is added to the simple act of attending to an external object or 
event. Awareness involves the agent or actor whose cortical representation is activated 
when attention is directed to it. Simply attending to an object or event requires action on 
the part of the cortical area of control, but the representation of the responsible actor need 
not be activated. For example, one may attend strongly to a bird which is struggling 
against the window without attentively processing one's own participation in the action of 
attending to it. Another example is given by Sartre (1957), in which I am running down 
the street to catch a bus and attending to "the bus having to be caught" but without 
attending to "myself having to catch it" (I may include myself in the attended events after 
I catch the bus). Thus, additional brain areas are active when attention is directed to the 
actor along with the external event. 
The properties coded by the representation of selfhood accessed by the self-attended 
triangular circuit undoubtedly vary greatly across individuals, but there is a common component of the representations that provides a means of locating the object-attended 
event in space and time. The location marker is almost always associated with the body, 
and the body surface is richly represented within the cortex (Damasio, 1994). The 
location of the body with respect to a changing environmental scene is updated 
continually within the self-representation. Thus, for example, I can realize that I 
perceived a windy day yesterday or that I am now perceiving a windy day, where "I" is 
associated with my body being in a particular place relative to the windy day event. 
But the self conceivably may be referenced on occasion without attending to one's bodily 
landscape. Verbal representations linked strongly to one's personal history are readily 
accessed from memory and can serve as the self-attended event. One would expect that, 
on many occasions, the verbal representation will automatically activate bodily landscape 
codes, and vice versa, so that attention to the self would typically involve both sets of 
representations. 
Specifically, it is assumed here that the event of awareness requires that attention be 
directed to the regions where the self is expressed at the same time that attention is 
directed to the cortical regions where the object is expressed (noting that, on occasion, 
self and object may be the same). Simultaneous activation of the two triangular circuits is 
assured if they are both activated from a common brain area in the frontal cortex, that is, 
the two triangular circuits are joined at their common control center. The action of 
activating both the object-attended and the self-attended triangular circuits presumably 
produces more than the simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) increase in activity at the 
object- and self-attended cortical sites of attentional expression. Within each triangular 
circuit the feedback from the expression site to the frontal area of control is synchronized 
with the activation flowing from the common control site to the expression site. As a 
result of the temporal coincidences between the two triangular circuits, not only is 
attention being directed to the self along with attention to an object, but attention is being 
directed to "the self doing the control" of attention to the object. 
The concept of awareness, as used here, is not necessarily synonymous with the concept 
of self-awareness. When attention is shared between an object and the self, the term 
"awareness" seems appropriate; when attention is directed entirely or almost entirely to 
the self, then the term "self-awareness" seems appropriate. An event of awareness may be 
relatively brief, as when we experience the coincident occurrences of the self and the 
perception of an object; and an event of awareness may be relatively prolonged, as when 
the sheer sensation of the object's attributes, and/or the sheer feeling of the self's bodily 
landscape, is allowed to intensify and be sustained for a time. Thus, according to the 
definition of awareness given by the present paper, an attention event is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for an awareness event, so that there can be attention without 
awareness but no awareness without attention. 
 
Notes <1> Figures and captions are from the original article and have been renumbered. In this 
precis Figures 1, 2, and 3 refer respectively to Figures 5, 3, and 4 in the original text. 
These figures, along with the original article, are available in PDF format from the 
website of the journal Consciousness & Cognition 
<http://www.apnet.com/www/journal/cc.htm>. 
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